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Knot of the World
German Idealism between Annihilation  
and Construction
K I R I L L  C H E P U R I N
Blackness is not the pathogen in afro- pessimism, the world is[—]maybe 
even the  whole possibility of and desire for a world.
— Jared Sexton
The world is its own rejection, the world’s rejection is the world.
— Jean- Luc Nancy
For we cannot claim to know for sure  whether or not our world, although 
it is contingent,  will actually come to an end one day.
— Quentin Meillassoux
A specter is haunting con temporary theory— the specter of the world. To 
think the world radically other wise; to refuse the very need for a world or 
to reduce it affirmatively to nothing, a mere illusion or hallucination; to 
dissolve it in absolute contingency or chaos; to think the real ity of that 
which the world forecloses, subjugates, excludes; to expose the world as to-
talizing and to find ways of tearing it down or opening it up; to work out 
an apocalyptic, postapocalyptic, messianic, posthuman ontology, ethics, 
or politics1— along this entire spectrum, the world remains, even in cases 
where its remains are thought of as, or  after, its end. Even when one could 
not care less about the world itself, one is troubled by the fact of the world. 
No  matter how spectral the world is declared to be, this fact remains a prob-
lem, with which all theory feels the need to engage. Even to say that the 
world is an illusion, that one  ought to desire no world, is to admit that 
the world is  there (and is at issue)— that it has the power to foreclose and 
divide, to make one hallucinate, and, most importantly, the power to 
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 survive, to remain. It is also to imply that the world is necessarily this way. 
But, why is the world  there in the first place? Why this world—of divi-
sions and exclusions, endless striving and endless postponement? Must it 
even be, this way or at all? Do we have to proceed from the fact that we— 
the subjects of modernity— are always already in this world?
Among  these and similar questions, I would single out one as central: 
how to think the world without absolutizing or justifying it—to construct 
a world or the way the world could be, or to reconstruct the way the world 
is, without falling into the logic of justification— while accounting for the 
world’s being  there, as fact or prob lem? From Quentin Meillassoux’s think-
ing of contingency as at once making the world pos si ble and ungrounding 
it, to the Laruellean Real as prior to and without world and yet also, in the 
presence of the world, “giving” and “receiving” the world, to the polemics 
between Afropessimism and black optimism or queer negativity and queer 
utopianism, this question is inevitably at stake. The relation between world- 
making and theodicy (in the sense of world justification) marks this as a 
political- theological question.2 In view of con temporary po liti cal theolo-
gy’s grappling with the prob lem of the (Christian- modern) world and its 
modes of legitimation, this question is central to its pre sent and  future.3
This is, at the same time, the typical transcendental conjunction, even 
the transcendental knot: conditions of possibility of experience are neces-
sary for us to even have experience at all, so that to think the possibility of 
the world is necessarily to justify the world as necessary. This conjunction 
stems from Immanuel Kant, who formulates it in terms of so- called “tran-
scendental conditions,” that is, conditions of possibility of experience—of 
the world as it appears to us. For Kant, in order for us to even have experi-
ence, it must fulfill certain conditions; it must conform to a specific set of 
categories and follow certain rules. Thus, the real ity of the world (of expe-
rience) is always negative and divisive: it is a world of objects separated from 
the subject and from each other; a world in which unity is secondary to 
separation and can only be thought by way of mediation (synthesis) and 
relation.  There can be, in fact, no experience  unless it conforms to  these 
conditions; the world can only appear in this and no other categorial way 
for it to cohere. If we are to think a world, it can only be this world— that 
is, a world structured in this categorial way— because this is the way expe-
rience (our being- in- the- world) works. The transcendental thus converts 
possibility into necessity: to inquire into the conditions  under which the 
world is pos si ble, is to show that  these conditions are necessary for us to 
even think a world at all. The possibility of a world is converted into the 
necessity of the world. To think the (possibility of the) world is to justify 
it as necessary: the transcendental turn is a theodical operation.4
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This conjunction of possibility and necessity can take many forms— 
including con temporary ones. For example, to say with François Laruelle 
that the world functions by way of dividing the Real is to say that, assum-
ing  there is a world, this is the way it necessarily works—to determine the 
world as necessarily this way, to convert a world into the world. This con-
junction may also be seen as a tension, within which the above question—
of how to think the world without justifying it or exorcizing it— exists.
This tension is already pre sent within German Idealism, spanning the 
conceptual space between two poles: world annihilation and world con-
struction. In this essay, I  will pre sent some of the ways in which German 
Idealism tried to resolve this tension. The point, however, is not to suggest 
that German Idealism succeeded in  doing so, but to put forward the tran-
scendental knot as a key prob lem that German Idealism shares with con-
temporary continental philosophy and po liti cal theology. Accordingly, the 
following sections  will approach the transcendental knot from dif er ent 
perspectives to highlight its vari ous aspects and to demonstrate the numer-
ous pitfalls when trying to deal with it—or how the world tends to survive 
all thinking of its end or rejection. It is crucial to engage with the world, 
with the way in which it is constructed (and can be deconstructed), and 
with the real power it possesses rather than announcing the world to be 
illusory, merely contingent, or easily refusable.
I take the pair of “annihilation” and “construction” from Friedrich Schelling.5 
Already in his early metaphysics, “the world” is a structure of divisive re-
lationality: the original opposition between subject and object, the I and 
the not- I, which is then mediated by the I. Finding itself in the world, the 
subject is divided from object, faced with external real ity as something 
dif er ent, other— something over and against which the I seeks to assert 
itself. Conflict, opposition, and striving are central characteristics of fini-
tude; the finite world is a world of negativity, alienation, division.
As always already in the world, the I strives to break  free of the world—
be that through gathering the world into one totality that the I would per-
fectly possess (the dream of perfect sovereignty) or by purifying itself of 
any not- I (the dream of perfect dispossession, of having no need for the 
world). The former is the activity of synthesis: the I brings what is multiple 
into a unity. The latter is morality, configured as the striving to become 
absolutely nothing, without any need or lack. It may be seen, however, that 
the end goal of both strivings is, essentially, the same. “The ultimate end 
goal of the finite I and the not- I, i.e., the end goal of the world,” Schelling 
writes, “is its annihilation as a world.” What the I strives  toward is abso-
lute freedom from the negativity of the world— from conflict, division, and 
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striving itself. This absolute freedom Schelling calls “absolute bliss.” As neg-
ative and divisive, the world is fundamentally unblissful; the I ’s existence 
in such a world is, accordingly, a constant longing for bliss. The world does 
nothing but defer, postpone, or mediate salvation and fulfillment. It is,  after 
all, through this postponement that the world itself survives. From within 
the world, bliss cannot but appear as transcendent: as  either a paradisal 
past or a  future salvific telos— never now.
Imagine, however, that one would not have to strive for bliss; that the 
subject, instead of wanting something, could get fulfillment immediately—
or not want anything at all. In this state of bliss, the subject would im-
mediately cease to be just that: a subject. If  there is nothing to strive for, 
nothing to negate or overcome, no positions to occupy, possessions to ac-
cumulate, or goals to achieve, what would subjectivity consist in? It would 
amount to simply being what one is. This is precisely absolute freedom: to 
simply be— without any self- assertion or lack, any further determination, 
any reason why. The I would become, as Schelling calls it, “absolute”— 
and thus cease to be an I, a transcendental subject or a subject of striving. 
As the mere am or is, this state may be termed “absolute being”; as being 
what it is, this being could only be an “absolute identity”— without any 
negativity or relation to otherness. As immanent only to itself, absolute free-
dom cannot become other, cannot transition to negation or any outside. 
“The absolute,” Schelling insists, “can never be mediated.” 6 It is “utterly 
immanent” and “has no need to go outside itself” (VI, 167). It is an abso-
lute now, without before or  after, possibility or actuality: immanently 
a temporal and amodal.
This kind of radical immanence can only function in and as the absence 
of a world. It possesses the “absolute power”: the power to “completely an-
nihilate” the world (VI, 122, 104).  There are two aspects to this affirma-
tive reduction to Nichts. Firstly, no common mea sure applies to absolute 
being (122), so that, from the perspective of the world, the absolute “can 
be neither object nor not- object, i.e., cannot be anything at all” (101)— 
can only be a nothingness, “nothing at all (= 0)” (119). Conversely, since 
the absolute has no place or need for otherness, it is the world that is noth-
ing at all, annihilated immediately by the power of the absolute as the 
absolutely nothing. This annihilation functions by transporting the phi-
los o pher to the zero point that must be thought of as preceding— not 
following upon— the world. In other words, even though the I always al-
ready finds itself in the world, this is not where speculative thought must 
begin— this is not where Schelling locates the Real. The world is a factu-
ally inevitable yet secondary, imposed, negative real ity. The zero point of 
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nothingness or bliss is prior to the imposition of the world, annihilating 
its very possibility.
That is, in fact, why the I strives  toward bliss in the first place:  because 
it knows or intuits the world to be forcefully imposed, foreclosing the Real 
as that which is without negativity or striving— and so seeks to return to 
it. The temporality of the I ’s striving in the world turns out to be one 
whereby the past is redoubled as the  future, the past bliss as  future bliss: a 
utopian loop. As long as the world is  there, past and  future remain sepa-
rate, with the world existing precisely in and as this gap. To collapse them—
to enact bliss right now— would necessitate a total collapse of the world. 
Why, then, must the world even be? “The main business of all philosophy 
consists,” as a result, “in resolving the prob lem of the being- there (Dasein) 
of the world.”7 It is with this prob lem that con temporary theory contin-
ues to strug gle.
It seems that this prob lem cannot, however, be resolved other than from 
within the world. In this, we approach the crux of the issue. At the stand-
point of the absolutely Real,  there is no world. As soon as the world is  there, 
however, we find ourselves always already in the world. Even if we say with 
Schelling that, in fact, the absolutely Real is the “essence” of the I or the 
soul, so that in a more essential sense we are always already nowhere or 
nothing, prior to the imposition of the world— a fact that the world 
forecloses— and that the world is therefore an unreal, even illusory  thing, 
this does nothing to make the world go away or cease its violent imposi-
tion. At best, it tears us between two “always already”: one blissful, another 
imposed, with which we still have to engage.
It is, in efect, through this metaopposition that the world is constructed. 
This tear between the two “always already” itself is (the fact of) the world, 
existing as the gap within the Real. I am taking the term construction from 
Schelling’s  later philosophy, where it means exhibiting the world specu-
latively in—or with a view to— the absolute. To put it simply: if absolute 
identity and freedom are the absolutely Real, then how to think the world? 
Since  there is no world at the standpoint of the absolute, to think the world 
is to think it as negation of the absolute— a negation of absolute freedom 
and bliss. In order to construct the world, then, we need not merely abso-
lute being or nothingness, but twoness and division. The world functions 
by way of dividing and then mediating (bringing into relation or unity). 
Accordingly, in order to be a “system of the world” without absolutizing the 
world,8 the system must be a system of oneness and twoness: it must at once 
annihilate or suspend the world and exhibit or construct it. The twoness is 
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introduced by the fact of the world, a fact that cannot be thought if we 
remain at the standpoint of the absolute. Once it is introduced, however, 
the world can only be thought by way of negation and doubling. In other 
words, if the absolutely Real is without world, and if speculative think-
ing seeks to think according to the Real and not according to the world— 
seeks not to make the world into the first— then the only way to think the 
world is to think it as negative and imposed (vis- à- vis the Real). To think 
the possibility of the world turns out to think it as necessarily the (nega-
tive) way it is. The world cannot, it seems, be thought other wise than in 
the very terms that serve to create it: the transcendental knot again.
To construct the world is thus, in the early Schelling, to reconstruct the 
way it is. But it is also to construct the end of the world. To think absolute 
being or nothingness as the Real, and to think the world as imposed nega-
tively upon the Real, is to think that which immediately annihilates the 
world. The world can only be thought as its rejection or end. However, from 
within the world (where we are as subjects), this annihilation cannot but 
be thought of as its  future (and not immediate) end. The issue is, in other 
words, how to think the annihilation of the world from within the world— 
given the fact that the world is  there and does not simply and immediately 
go away.
If the absolutely Real is what annihilates the world, then to do so be-
comes imperative. In the absolute itself, no imperative could arise; how-
ever, from the point of view of the world, the soul’s striving for the absolute 
translates into the demand of putting an end to the world. “In order to 
resolve the antagonism between I and not- I,” Schelling says, “nothing  else 
remains except complete destruction of the finite sphere (practical reason).” 
It is only if “we pierce through  these [finite] spheres”—as demanded by 
the moral law— “that we find ourselves in the sphere of absolute being” 
(VI, 145). As a result, the question Why is  there a world at all? “cannot be 
resolved except the way Alexander the  Great resolved the Gordian knot, 
i.e., through the canceling- out of the question itself.”9 It is in the cutting 
of the knot of the world so as to break through to absolute identity and 
freedom, that the only resolution of the prob lem of the world consists. 
The moral imperative “enters, not in order to untie the knot, but to cut it 
into pieces by means of absolute demands” (VI, 100). To Why must the 
world be?, the only absolute answer is, The world must not be.
Since, however, the world is  there, this absolute demand can only be re-
mediated (from within the world) in terms of a  future. The prob lem is 
that the canceling- out of the world, its affirmative reduction to nothing-
ness, must be enacted from within the world. In order for the soul to strive 
 toward the end of the world, this end must be configured as pos si ble— 
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become representable as a goal. That which is supposed to annihilate the 
world becomes thereby a position in the world, a telos or Endzweck  toward 
which the world must be directed. The absolute demand of immediate an-
nihilation is impossible and so gets postponed into a pos si ble  future that 
is, constitutively, never now as long as the world remains. All that the striv-
ing  toward this  future can realistically amount to, then, is a pro gress of 
morality, an approximation of the absolute demand: an “incremental ap-
proximation to the end goal” (VI, 124). The world is supposed to be, in 
the end, annihilated, but this annihilation is always not- yet. In this way, 
the world remediates bliss as telos. As soon as nothingness becomes pos-
sibility and telos, it gets caught up in the same logic of futurity thanks to 
which the world exists in the first place: the gap in which past is redoubled 
as  future. Via possibility and the not- yet, the world endlessly defers its 
annihilation.
By thinking the end of the world as the end goal—by thinking bliss as 
producible from within the world— the world is thus reproduced. Not only 
can the world only be thought as its rejection or end; the end of the world 
is the world. To construct the world with a view to its end thus runs the 
risk of justifying the world as the only way it can and must be.
I do not intend to suggest that this issue is absolutely unresolvable; to sug-
gest so would also mean to absolutize the world. In his  later thinking, 
Schelling may be seen as attempting to approach this issue diferently—to 
think the fact of the world without reproducing the way the world is. In 
his so- called identity philosophy, Schelling insists that the world is some-
thing that we have imposed upon ourselves and need simply to reject; that 
we need to begin not with striving but with the refusal of striving; that we 
need to remain where we already are, to remain in the now, which is what 
the world forecloses.  There are not two “always already,” but only one. Es-
sentially, we are never in the world. All finitude, temporality, relation, are 
already “annihilated in God.”10
The identity philosophy proclaims the finite world, this world of reflec-
tion and the relation between subject and object premised on their separa-
tion, to be an illusion (Schein) that only appears if we adopt the point 
of view of reflection in the first place— a product of our “finite” way of 
looking at  things, which must “dis appear” if we are to think what is Real.11 
What is needed is to refuse to see the world that way: to re- vision the 
world as bliss, thereby annihilating it as world.  There is but one being, an 
immanence common to all  things; to see being other wise—as divided—is 
to introduce division into it, to create the real ity of which we then futilely 
strive to break  free. To intuit this immanence- in- common is to see all  things 
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as simply being what they are—to see the pure “=” at the heart of every-
thing, in which all distinctions between par tic u lar and universal, lower and 
higher,  human and nonhuman dis appear. Finite  things may come into be-
ing and perish; but the “=” persists. In this, all divisions that make up the 
world are dissolved.12 To construct the true real ity is to exhibit it indifer-
ently, that is to say, without diference, relation, or striving.13
On the one hand, this is a more fruitful move: to unground the very 
transcendental conjunction—to see the world in which we modern sub-
jects exist as one whose necessity is tied to the conditions of possibility that 
produce this world as necessary—in this case, a certain way of looking at 
the world (of producing it by envisioning it as a world of alienation and 
division) that, one could argue, becomes dominant with modernity.14 One 
could then investigate this conjunction historically, genealogically, or spec-
ulatively in order to destabilize it and to think a world not in terms of the 
transcendental knot. The transcendental is thereby made contingent or un-
grounded. To expose this contingency is also to insist that the being that 
all  things have in common, prior to the world thus produced, is where one 
already is, so that one must inhabit this common being and immanently 
refuse the world as unreal.
On the other hand, declaring this world to be an illusion, or perhaps 
something the absolute contingency of which needs to be exposed in or-
der to think the Real or the event (for instance, to think with Meillassoux 
the coming of God as an eventuality that is absolutely contingent15), re-
mains a prob lem insofar as it leaves the world  free to haunt us. Insisting 
with Schelling on a being- in- common that the world divides, or with Mei-
llassoux on the absolute of hyper- contingency that would allow us to 
think the event that “we might hope to see” one day,16 still does not an-
swer the question of what to do about the fact of the world— and the fact 
that it is the way it is— a fact that, as it  were, recedes into the background 
of any destabilization of the world as mere illusion or as absolutely contin-
gent. The world is made into a ghost, and the more one tries to exorcize it 
or to inhabit that which has (or wants to have) nothing to do with it, or 
the more one leaves its conditions of possibility to a throw of the die, the 
longer the world continues its haunting: a spectral dilemma, though not 
quite in Meillassoux’s own sense— perhaps even a spectral knot.
Simply letting  things be in order to immanently think absolute bliss runs 
the risk of simply leaving the world be, too. Similarly, to say that it is all 
up to an absolute, unmasterable contingency, may amount to justifying 
the world as merely (contingently) the way it is—to also simply letting it 
be. Contingency can do the work of legitimation as well: perhaps it is sim-
ply bad luck that the world is the way it is? Perhaps all we can do is hope 
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for the lucky throw? Fi nally, to make the world into a ghost by proclaim-
ing it to be illusory runs the risk of implying it can be simply refused—of 
trivializing the world’s vio lence, thereby also justifying the world. This is 
not to say  there is no way to evade  these pitfalls. However, upon this way, 
one has to tread a very thin line,  behind which the world continues to loom 
and which cannot, it seems, be traversed without engaging with the world 
in some way. No  matter how illusory or contingent the world is announced 
to be, one has to think of ways of dealing with it— with the fact of the 
world’s forceful imposition—if one does not want unwittingly to absolu-
tize the world.
What to do about (or in) the world, too, remains a question with which 
Schelling continues to grapple. Elsewhere I have argued that the logic of 
highest agency (including moral agency) in Schelling’s so- called  middle pe-
riod amounts to acting out of absolute indiference—to simply enacting 
what is right or beautiful without caring about what the world proclaims 
to be pos si ble.17 To act in such a way is to act in the world without relation 
to the world—an operativity that, for Schelling, completely disregards and, 
as it  were, indiferently cuts through all worldly production and media-
tion. Moral virtue in par tic u lar is  here no longer a  matter of moral striv-
ing or pro gress, but a direct, immediate expression of the (soul’s or God’s) 
atemporal essence. “Let the [indiferent, blissful] soul act in you, or act 
through and through as a holy man”18— that is, one who acts, as Schelling 
points out in the Freedom essay, immediately out of the divine, out of “the 
highest resoluteness for what is right, without any choice.”19 In this state, 
the soul is immanent only to itself, so that morality, as the immediate ex-
pression of this immanence, operates without any deliberation and with-
out relation to any context. It is atemporal in the sense of being without 
relation to the world’s temporality or regime of reproduction, instead di-
rectly enacting what is right. It does not negotiate or construe dialectical 
relationships with the world; it intervenes into it. Morality is indiferent to 
the world as it is while being operative in it. In this, one may be said to act 
in the world without legitimating it.
This, too, is a way of annihilating the world. The basic idea  here may be 
seen as responding to the prob lem we saw in the early Schelling. Any agency 
that is supposed to break through this world of actualization and the not- 
yet must not itself be inscribed into or function as part of the pro cess of 
actualization. Any activity that seeks to abolish the position of the world 
must not itself be represented as a position within the world. Accordingly, 
to ask  whether such an agency is pos si ble is to fall back into the logic of 
possibility and striving. Such an agency, then, fundamentally cannot be 
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self- reflective or inquire into its own conditions of possibility (bypassing 
thereby the transcendental knot); it cannot relate to any par tic u lar con-
figurations of the world; it cannot act  toward any position or any telos. The 
way it (mindlessly) cuts through the world may best be likened to a forest 
fire or perhaps a flood. No won der that Schelling compares it at once to 
divine love (Liebe) and divine wrath (Zorn)— a divine vio lence that needs, 
furthermore, to be power ful enough to disregard worldly possibility, even 
to obliterate it so it does not block its path.
Where is such absolute power to be found? To ask this question is to 
raise the crucial issue. The world,  after all, does block one’s path. Even if 
we take the world, most radically, to be an illusion, its power— the vio-
lence it does, the hallucinations it produces, the fear it  causes, the divisions 
it enacts— does not become any less real. Seeing as the world’s divisions 
have real power, it becomes a question of enacting a power that would ri-
val and even overpower the world— a power that would be capable of blow-
ing up, setting on fire, flooding the wall or the colonial settlement that is 
the world. To locate this power in that which is transcendent to the world 
(a coming God perhaps), would be to reintroduce indefinite futurity into 
the picture. Another Schellingian answer would refer to this power as 
“nature”— this being of vast indiference and im mense power, on which 
the modern world (of the Anthropocene) is imposed. It is unclear, how-
ever,  whether waiting for a coming retribution from nature is any dif er-
ent from waiting for the arrival of a God. To wait is, again, to let the world 
be— which means that, in order not merely to wait, one needs to find ways 
of not simply leaving the world in place. That, in turn, implies thinking 
the world and the real ity of its power (a thinking absent in the divine vio-
lence itself), even inhabiting it, if only to know where to ignite or how to 
produce or identify the cracks in the wall that should help make it give in 
to the coming flood. This issue is central not only for po liti cal theology 
but for con temporary thought as a  whole. In Laruellean terms, the prob-
lem is that the Real and the world are both real, albeit in dif er ent ways, so 
that the real ity of the world’s power, if it is to be confronted, cannot sim-
ply be discounted as illusory.  Unless it is confronted, however, the world 
continues to persist.
The move of beginning with what is absolutely nothing from the point of 
view of the world appears likewise in Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Wissenschafts-
lehre. The dogmatists— those who take the world to be the ultimate real ity— 
“think of  things as the first, and make knowledge depend on  those, be 
formed through  those.” Knowledge and being for them coincide, so that, 
in dogmatic philosophy, the world fundamentally remains in place. The 
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dogmatists, as a result, can only have “doctrines of  things: ontology, cos-
mology, etc.”— mere “images of  things.” The task is, however, to investi-
gate the conditions of possibility of the world as it appears, or to trace how 
the world is constructed: a “construction a priori,” which cannot begin with 
anywhere (any place or position) in the world. This kind of knowledge can, 
accordingly, only begin with a nonplace that must be thought of as pre-
ceding and totally dis- placing the world: the task is to think “knowledge 
as something independent— and for that  matter, first, the question of 
 whether  things can still have any being outside knowledge if left in their 
place.” The dogmatists cannot think such a nowhere, and so “cannot have 
any Wissenschaftslehre.” To them, “it would be the doctrine of nothing.”20
As proceeding immanently from the nonplace of total displacement, 
“knowledge structures itself through itself as an or ga nized and articu-
lated full system. . . .  One part of that system is its concept of itself in its 
above- mentioned original organ ization. This is, precisely, the W.L. [Wis-
senschaftslehre].”21 The point from which the Wissenschaftslehre begins, as 
part of the system of knowledge, is the point of the original completion of 
the system of knowledge as such. That the system is complete— a totality 
that is, however, not the totality of every thing in the world— and that the 
standpoint of the Wissenschaftslehre is the atopic point where this totality 
coincides with itself, is crucial. It is, for Fichte, the atopic totality indexed 
by the system that ungrounds the world as always not- yet and instead 
grounds knowledge.22
“God” is what Fichte calls this atopic standpoint, similar to Schelling’s 
absolute being. This being, too, is without negation or transition to other-
ness. As such, it cannot act, or produce any world.23 Accordingly, the cen-
tral issue is that of glimpsing the  ought (Soll)  behind the world. To what 
end must the world be? What is its meaning, its justification? To think the 
world without such an  ought would be to think it as the mere capacity to 
efect an infinite series of  things or positions, in space and time—as a 
potentiality without end or purpose, as meaningless, a nothing. But to 
reduce the world to nothing (Vernichtung) is—in a familiar inversion—to 
suspend this endless series of schematization (the drive to instantiate fur-
ther  things, without end), in order to expose the absolute being that it fore-
closes, a being that is itself a no- thing in the world. To inquire into the 
 ought is to suspend the world as perpetually not- yet, so as to find oneself 
precisely at the original atopic standpoint with which we saw the system 
begin.24
To think the world from the standpoint of the  ought, is to demand 
that the reason  behind the world— the  ought itself— become vis i ble. The 
 ought is thereby redoubled: as beginning and as end (as “the  ought of the 
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visibility of the  ought,” the telos of the world). “To construct the true 
world of sense” is, accordingly, to think the utopian point where the world 
coincides fully with the visibility of its  ought. The gap between the two 
“ oughts” fully filled, we find ourselves back at the original atopic stand-
point.25 Why, then, must we leave it in the first place?  Because, again, the 
world is  there and its meaning needs to be glimpsed. The existence of the 
world is the condition of possibility of the  ought (it is  because the world is 
 there that the realization of the  ought is thought to be pos si ble26)— but, 
also, it is only “on the condition that [individuals] find themselves on the 
path of glimpsing the  ought” that the world and its  ought may be seen to 
coincide: that the world may be regarded as justified.27 To construct the 
world is to reconstruct it on the condition of its  ought, and thus as not yet 
the (true) world— with a view to its end; and to think the end of the 
world, the point where its  ought is fully vis i ble, is to justify the world. 
Thereby, the world is constructed as the condition of possibility of its own 
( future) end. The ante- original, atopic beginning of the system is remedi-
ated into an eschatological telos to which the world is bound— and which 
is itself bound to the world.
The transcendental knot could not be tied any tighter. It is, perhaps, 
time to cut it again.
An alternative approach would be to think the world without an 
“ ought”— the empty potentiality we glimpsed in Fichte.28 In this approach, 
the transcendental conjunction is destabilized via the focus on the world- 
making capacity without a normative horizon or any necessary pro cess of 
actualization. This would amount neither to absolutizing the world nor to 
declaring it an illusion, but to proceeding from the fact that the world is 
made or  imagined. This is the early Romantic, poetic focus.  Here, the tran-
scendental knot is both acknowledged and ungrounded by thinking the 
conditions of possibility of the world without thinking this world (or any 
other world) as necessary or seeking to justify it.
“Is not,” asks Friedrich Schlegel, “this entire, unending world con-
structed by the understanding out of incomprehensibility or chaos?”29 
The world is endlessly constructed (“unending”), serving to foreclose the 
incomprehensible— the chaos— not only as the Real but also, so to speak, 
as the material from which the world is being constructed. This idea is Kan-
tian in origin: the in- itself as providing the material of sensation which 
the subject arranges into the world with the help of the categories. In Kant, 
however, the standpoint of the in- itself (which Schlegel calls “chaos”) is 
cognitively inaccessible to the subject— and, as mentioned  earlier, the cat-
egories themselves are necessary for the world to appear to the subject in 
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the first place. The categories are thereby fixed and justified as necessary. 
They are also binaries or dichotomies (which are then mediated), in keep-
ing with the character of the world as imposing itself on the Real by divid-
ing and mediating it. Schlegel, too, acknowledges that the world, and the 
way we reflect about the world, functions this way. We tend to employ bi-
nary terms to construct the world or make it comprehensible— not just the 
ones found in Kant’s  table of categories, but also high and low, serious and 
jocular, beautiful and ugly, natu ral and artificial, and many  others.
This is where, for Schlegel, irony comes in, which takes any pair of such 
terms and subverts or collapses them—so that, faced with irony, the sub-
ject cannot know  whether the ironist (the ironic text or ironic speech) is 
being serious or jocular, where the higher might become the lower and the 
lower the higher, where the familiar might be revealed as strange, the natu-
ral as artfully constituted, and the ugly as beautiful, if in a dif er ent, un-
usual way. Thereby irony interrupts the flow of the world’s construction in 
which we are habitually engaged, ungrounding the world’s imposition and 
transporting the ironist to a standpoint at which all binaries are immedi-
ately collapsed. The operation of irony amounts to “a total interruption and 
canceling- out” of any pro cess of construction (KFSA, 11:88). This serves 
not only to expose binary categories as themselves constructed and the 
world as produced—so that the alleged necessity of the way the world is 
gets fully suspended— but also to expose the Real on which  these binaries 
are imposed and which can only be thought of as collapsing any binary, 
and thus as incomprehensible: the Real of incomprehensibility or chaos.
“Irony,” says Schlegel, “is the clear consciousness . . .  of the infinitely 
full chaos” (KFSA, 2:263). The irony of this expression, suspending the 
clear- chaotic opposition, is itself programmatic.  There is, Schlegel ob-
serves, a certain symmetry to the chaos inherent in irony, with its move of 
“logical disor ga ni za tion” (2:403)— a symmetry that cannot be the stan-
dard symmetrical demarcation between A and non- A. Rather, symmetry 
 here names the structure of indistinction between any binary terms, or 
the total (“infinitely full”) collapse of dichotomies. In nature- philosophical 
terms, Schlegel speaks of this full suspension as “the point of indiference 
[Indifferenzpunkt] where every thing is saturated” (18:391), where every-
thing is, to the point of indistinction, dissolved into one.
The first operation of irony stops, as it  were, the cycle of reproduction of 
binaries, completely suspending the world with all its binaries, so as to begin 
with the chaos that must be regarded as prior to any world. At the atopic 
standpoint from which irony proceeds, all binaries are collapsed—so that, 
for example, all is jest and all is seriousness at once (KFSA, 2:160). The all 
suggests  here not an alternation between the terms but an affirmation of a 
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point of suspension in which the two (and any other opposing terms) co-
incide at any given moment. This is an operation of immediate annihila-
tion, too— the world’s decreation to the zero point that collapses all 
divisions. In a fragment from his philosophical notebooks, Schlegel con-
nects neutralization, annihilation (nothingness), and chaos in the following 
way: “The chaos relates to the nothing in the same way that the world re-
lates to the chaos. Chaos [is] the only real concept of the nothing. Nothing 
itself [is] the purely analytic concept. . . .  The neutral, too, is confusion and 
chaos. . . .  Nothing (Nichts) is more original than the chaos” (18:78).30 Else-
where Schlegel says, “Only that confusion is a chaos which can give rise to a 
new world” (2:263), and thus to speak of chaos is to speak of the world 
suspended or decreated. Similarly, to speak of nothingness, this purely ideal 
or “analytic” absence of anything, is to speak of chaos as a state in which all 
oppositions are refused in the all- encompassing Indifferenzpunkt.
 There is, in this chaos, no trajectory or topos, no movement of media-
tion or distribution of possibility and actuality. It is the void of negativity 
grasped as “real,” as an immanent materiality of nothingness—as pure ma-
terial in which all distinctions are collapsed and with which the work of 
construction (of a world) begins. Chaos is nothingness considered as pro-
ductive and generative. The ensuing construction reconfigures immanently 
this world- material— and in this, it is for Schlegel at once critical (“critique 
is the universal chaos”; KFSA, 18:366) and artistic: “the contact between 
the artist and the material is only thinkable as creation from nothing” 
(18:133). No won der, then, that chaos is intrinsic for Schlegel both to the 
novel (“in its form, the novel is a well- formed artificial chaos”; 16:207) and 
to Romantic poetry (18:337). It is from this atopic standpoint of material 
nothingness that any binary— and any distribution of binaries, that is, a 
world— may be said to be constructed.
This decreation is configured by Schlegel, furthermore, as a revolution-
ary operation: “The chaos that, in the modern world, has previously been 
unconscious and passive, must return actively; eternal revolution” (KFSA, 
18:254). Revolution is decreation followed by creation; or, even, creation 
by way of decreation. The same princi ple— “creation from nothing”— can 
be discerned for Schlegel in the three main con temporary events: the French 
Revolution, Fichtean idealism, and “the new [Romantic] poetry” (18:315). 
This nexus is crucial. What needs to be thought is simultaneous decon-
struction of the world (to chaos or nothing) and its construction— one that 
is “artistic” or “poetic” in the sense of experimenting immanently with the 
pure material and constructing a world out of it: the transcendental con-
junction as decoupled from the justification of the world  under construc-
tion as necessary or the best pos si ble. It is this decoupling that the terms 
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poetry or art index— and not the valorization of the subjective and the 
arbitrary (as the supposed “subjectivism” of early Romanticism is some-
times understood). The ironist undermines any world she constructs by 
keeping open the capacity to confuse, to collapse any binary. The Kantian- 
Fichtean transcendental conjunction is impor tant for Schlegel  because it 
allows to see the world as constructed— without necessarily thinking it as 
necessary. The knot has to be cut only if one ties it in the first place; but 
why must one do so?
To think the poetic with Schlegel is to think construction without 
justification, and potentiality or capacity without necessity, including the 
necessity of actualization— but also without end. Romantic poetry is 
“progressive” (as Schlegel terms it) not in the sense of a not- yet, but as the 
absence of end or telos. Nor does it mean “incomplete” in any standard 
sense: instead, poetic construction begins immanently with a complete 
suspension of the world. The point is not to exorcize the world, thereby 
demonizing it or making it haunt us, but to think it (or, with Schelling’s 
holy man, act in it) without investment in the way it is or could be. Thus, 
even if we accept that it is necessary to construct a world in some way, 
this does not have to mean justifying this world as necessary or implying 
that its construction must proceed in this and not some other way, 
 toward this end or  toward some end at all, or that it needs to be objective 
or serious.
That is, of course, an impor tant part of Hegel’s criticism of Schlegel: 
that irony “takes nothing seriously”31— that it does not take the objective 
movement of world history seriously. I do not have the space  here to con-
sider Hegel—or, for that  matter, Marx—in any detail. But the way the 
transcendental knot is tied to world justification remains central to them 
both. In Hegel, world history famously is theodicy, and the transcenden-
tal structure— the way spirit produces its own conditions of possibility as 
necessary for its actualization and forward movement—is central to this 
history. To destabilize this conjunction the way Schlegel does is to endan-
ger the teleology of spirit.32 The issue, in Marx, of changing the conditions 
(of possibility) that are necessary to efect this change in the first place 
points to a similar knot. In the words of Lisa Robertson:
 Here is Marx’s big dilemma, the reason he goes to Lucretius:
practice arises from conditions
yet  these are the conditions we must change.33
This is, in dif er ent terms, precisely the issue which this essay has attempted 
to outline. In order to resolve it, Marx, Robertson suggests, turns to a think-
ing that is poetic in form. In the post- Kantian context, poetry indexes a 
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“chaotic imagination that generates the promises of new worlds.”34 Roman-
ticism wants to think the possibility of new worlds— but is that  really 
the way to resolve the transcendental knot, this tension between annihi-
lating and justifying the world? The (possibility of the) appearance of the 
new is,  after all, at the heart of this tension that is political- theological 
in character.
This tension seems to remain as long as the world remains— because it in-
dexes the fact of the world. In this essay, I have partially sketched the 
theoretical spectrum that emerges from attempts to engage with this ten-
sion and some of the pitfalls along the way. I have argued that, before Ger-
man Idealism proceeds to construct the world, it annihilates it in order to 
reveal the Real that the world forecloses, so as to begin with this Real and 
not with the world. Instead of proceeding from the world as the ultimate 
real ity, Idealism proceeds from a zero point absolutely  free from any need 
for or any necessary transition to a world. This starting operation trans-
ports the speculative thinker to an atopic standpoint at which the world is 
turned to or exposed as Nichts, and which must be thought of as preceding 
the world. To annihilate the world, the way I have used this term, is to 
expose the world as secondary and imposed—to reduce it affirmatively to 
nothing—so as to proceed immanently from this nothingness (alternatively 
termed chaos, God, or bliss) as that which the world would foreclose.
To conceive immanently of a standpoint at which  there is no world, re-
vealing the world as imposed, is, however, not enough. For what to do 
about the fact that the world is  there— the fact that we are subjects in and 
subject to the necessity of the world? For, no  matter the force of world 
destitution and affirmation of nothingness, it is the construction (the 
thinking of the world) that ultimately determines  whether, how, and to 
what extent the world survives and is justified. This construction may, as 
in Schlegel, take the form of ironic or poetic deconstruction, of taking 
apart the binaries that make up the world in order to freely rearrange 
them— but it is crucial that some sort of construction occur, some sort of 
inquiry into the exact conditions and function of the taking place or im-
position of the world. If the construction is simply forgone, the world is 
 either absolutized or turned into a ghost (or both). It might turn out, in this 
case, that the world is reproduced by way of its rejection, that the specter of 
the world persists paradoxically by way of its exorcism. Accordingly, the 
manner in which, and the end to which, the construction takes place is key. 
It does not suffice to declare the world to be nothing; it is impor tant to de-
stabilize the very conditions of possibility of the world and not to, wittingly 
or unwittingly, absolutize them. Even if the world is taken to be made or 
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 imagined, it is essential to trace how this imagination works— and the 
power it has over us. Deconstruction alone is insufficient; construction 
must take place. Such is a central insight that German Idealism bequeaths 
to con temporary po liti cal theology and con temporary theory.
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